| THE FIRST
COMMUNIST MINISTRY
Prabhat Patnaik
The Communist Party,
consisting of Marxist revolutionaries who had emerged,
to start with, in different parts of British India, had
made significant inroads into the princely states by the
early 1940s. Telengana, Punnapra-Vyalar, Ranpur and Nilagiri
(both in Orissa) illustrated this spread of the Communist
movement from British India to the princely states. In
the south, in the British Indian territory itself, the
Communists were so strong that in the 1952 elections to
the Madras province, consisting largely of the old Madras
Presidency, they emerged as the single largest Party in
the legislative assembly, but were denied, unfairly, the
chance to form the government. Instead, Rajaji was brought
from Delhi to head the first elected government in the
province. After the formation of states on linguistic
basis, when the old princely domains were assimilated
with regions of British India, the strength of the Communists
in the south got enhanced in two specific areas where
they could hope to form governments. These were Andhra
and Kerala. They failed in Andhra in March 1955 but succeeded
in Kerala in April 1957. Interestingly their vote share
in the two states were not too dissimilar. But they faced
united opposition in one, and not in the other. Kerala
thus became the site for the first elected Communist ministry
in the world. (True, San Marino and Guyana can claim precedence
over Kerala in this regard. But San Marino is too small;
and Chedi Jagan’s party in Guyana, though inspired
by Marxism, and consisting of Communists, was not exactly
a Communist party).
The first Communist ministry had its task clearly cut
out, namely, to carry forward decisively the democratic
revolution which the Indian National Congress, notwithstanding
the promises made in its 1931 Resolution at the Karachi
session, had shown itself incapable of doing. Historical
experience confirms that wherever the bourgeoisie appears
late on the historical scene, it invariably compromises
with feudalism instead of dealing those heavy blows against
it, which it had done earlier in its career. It is the
working class and its political formation, therefore,
upon which the task of carrying forward the democratic
revolution devolves in these circumstances. Post-independence
India had been no exception to this. Hence, when the Communist
government came to power in the state, its task was clear;
but it was constrained by the Constitutional limits within
which state governments have to function.
The two spheres, where the state government could push
forward, given its Constitutional limits, related to agrarian
and social issues. The Congress had of course brought
in land reforms in the states it ruled, in the form of
tenancy reforms and land ceilings, but these, as several
studies show, had not succeeded in breaking landlordism.
At the most, some rich tenants had succeeded in getting
ownership rights, but the old landlords could continue,
provided they used concealed, and hence insecure, tenancy,
or took to capitalist farming with wage labour. Landlordism
therefore continued, but the position of the petty tenants,
far from getting better, actually worsened: many were
evicted or reduced to inferior status as tenants at will.
In fact prior to Kerala, the only other state where fairly
successful land reforms had been carried out was Jammu
and Kashmir under Sheikh Abdullah in the early fifties.
The Land Reforms Bill of 1959 introduced by the first
Communist ministry had the very clear objective of breaking
landlordism. It wanted to realize the slogan of “land
to the tiller” which had been the promise of the
freedom struggle. The idea was to make tenants the owners
of the land they cultivated and to ban future tenancy
in all forms. Resuming land for “own-cultivation”
which was a euphemism for tenancy-at-will or wage-based
cultivation, and which had been the bane of land reforms
undertaken by the Congress governments, was not permitted.
Not surprisingly, there was a furore over the Land Reforms
Bill, with landlords up in arms.
This was accompanied by a second furore, and that was
on the Education Bill, which sought to regulate private
educational institutions. The syllabi, and the salaries
and working conditions of the teachers, in private institutions
were brought into conformity with what prevailed outside.
And the Bill provided for government takeover of private
institutions where the management went against the law.
The Bill was an essential measure for introducing modern,
secular and quality education in the state, in the place
of the education that was being provided by a host of
religious and caste-based organizations that ran these
private institutions.
The furore that accompanied the tabling of these two Bills,
as is well-known, led to the so-called “liberation
struggle” that eventually resulted in the infamous
decision of the Central government to dismiss the Communist
government, a decision criticized by even Professor S.Gopal,
Pandit Nehru’s acclaimed and sympathetic biographer.
While the Communists lost the election that followed,
they managed interestingly to increase the percentage
of votes they polled.
But even though the first Communist government could not
implement its proposed legislation, the lead it provided
started a process that broke to a considerable extent
the feudal shackles over Kerala’s economy and society.
There was no going back on the agenda it had put forth,
and in the course of time Kerala emerged, apart from West
Bengal, as the most successful state in the area of land
reforms. By 1993, 1.5 million tenants in the state had
benefited from tenancy legislation, with 2.43 lakh hecatres
of land accruing to them. In addition 5.28 lakh agricultural
labourers had been provided house-sites. To be sure, there
were important segments of the poor who could not directly
benefit much from the land reforms measures, such as the
tribal population, fishermen and agricultural labourers
(whose gain was confined to house-sites). But even though
the task is not complete in this sphere, as also in the
sphere of regulating private educational institutions
where the 2006 LDF government had to bring in fresh legislation,
what has been achieved is nonetheless quite remarkable.
Indeed the very fact that issues confronting the state
even today were anticipated by the first Communist ministry
shows the prescience of that ministry.
But it also shows the persistence, at least in the social
realm, of the feudal shackles. This has to do partly with
the fact that certain spheres have remained untouched
by reform, but partly also with a revival or even the
appearance for the first time of certain feudal traits
that either did not exist earlier (or existed only marginally)
or had received setbacks. For instance, notwithstanding
the enormous achievements of Kerala in the realm of women’s
literacy and women’s education, patriarchy was never
confronted head on. Feudal-patriarchal attitudes therefore
persist in the realm of gender relations. In addition
there has been a recrudescence of religiosity, casteism
and even of institutions like dowry. This has accompanied
a process of economic dis-empowerment of the poor which
has occurred paradoxically during the very period when
Kerala’s growth rate appears to have picked up.
The peasantry, liberated from the feudal yoke, has become
a victim of the capitalist world market, where the prices
of the cash-crops, to which it has increasingly been moving,
have shown in a secular sense a relative, and even an
absolute, decline. The agricultural labourers, though
protected by a comparatively high minimum wage, have witnessed
dwindling employment opportunities. The conditions of
the marginalized groups like the dalits and the tribals
have become even more precarious. On the other side, middle-class
incomes have increased sharply, together with middle-class
consumerism, which paradoxically has denied resources
to the state exchequer to a point where even the famed
“Kerala model” of social security is in jeopardy
for lack of public spending. Inequalities in Kerala have
increased greatly in the neo-liberal era, despite the
large remittances from the Gulf, which have been a source
of support for the bottom half of the population. Together
with these inequalities, pressure has increased for the
use of the government’s limited fiscal resources
for luxury infrastructure projects and for “social
bribes” to domestic and foreign corporate capitalists
to invest in Kerala.
The first Communist ministry therefore is not just an
historical episode to be remembered and celebrated on
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of its formation.
The process it initiated has gone far, but still remains
incomplete. Kerala has witnessed much change, and yet
the issues it confronts today are not altogether different
from those which it confronted in 1957. And the social
forces opposed to the democratic revolution today are
no less strong than they were in 1957. Their composition
may not be identical today to what it was in 1957, but
their power remains significant.
It follows that the need today is not just to complete
the unfinished agenda of the first Communist ministry
in the state, but even to re-assert that agenda, which
sought to achieve a democratic and egalitarian Kerala,
against other competing agendas that are fashionable in
the present neo-liberal era.
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